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MINNESOTA'S STATUTE OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
By

RALPH

H. DWAX*

changes in the -Minnesota law of ti-usts were made
by "an act providing for the creation and administration of
charitable trusts" passed by the Minnesota legislature in 1927.1
This statute reinstates charitable trusts to a position much like
that at common law. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the
general effect of the statute and some of the problems which are
likely to arise under it. Nothing so ambitious as an exhaustive
treatment of those problems is attempted here. For the most
part, references to fuller discussions in standard textbooks and in
legal periodicals will take the place of any detailed analysis of the
cases. However, some emphasis will be put upon the cases in
the New York court of appeals since the Tilden Act of 1893,IMPORTANT

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
2'Minn. Laws 1927, ch. 180; Masons 1927 Minn. Stat.. sec. 8090-1
to 8090-4 inclusive. An earlier statute dealing with charitable trusts
'was held to be unconstitutional, on the ground that its subject matter
was not expressed in its title. Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 'Minn.
210, 100 N. W. 1104. No such difficulty is anticipated as to the 1927
statute. Cf. Loomis v. Mack, (1915) 183 Mich. 674, 150 N. W. 370,
affirming by an equally divided court a decree sustaining a Michigan
statute on charitable trusts, the validity of which was attacked on
that ground. The title of the Michigan statute was less clear than
that of the 1927 Minnesota statute. A later amendment avoided this
constitutional objection. See In re Brown's Estate, (1917) 198 Mich.
544, 562, 165 N. W. 929; Greenman v. Phillips, (1928) 241 .Mich. 464,
467. 217 N. W. 1.
"New York, Laws 1893, ch. 701. This Act, as subsequently
amended, is now Real Property Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws of New
York, 1923, ch. 51) sec. 113; Personal Property Law (Cahill's Consol.
Laws of New York, 1923, ch. 42) sec. 12.
This statute, following shortly after the failure of the Tilden trust,
Tilden v. Green, (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880. 14 L. R. A. 33,
27 Am. St. Rep. 487, was held to reestablish in New York the law
of charitable uses and trusts. Allen v. Stevens, (1899) 161 N. Y.
122, 55 N. E. 568. For an almost contemporaneous discussion of this
case, its background, and its implications, see Fowler, Charitable Uses
in New York, (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 10.
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because the background of those cases is similar to that of future
litigation in Minnesota. There is some satisfaction in the thought
that the state which led us into our difficulties may help to lead
us to a better treatment of this important legal and social matter.
The unsatisfactory history of the repudiation in Minnesota of
those favorites of the common law, charitable trusts, by a construction of our statutes, borrowed from New York, has been
traced in this REvIEw 3 and will not be repeated at any length here.
Our statutes abolished all express trusts not expressly authorized.'
Trusts for charitable purposes, with certain exceptions presently
to be noticed, were not expressly authorized.' The result was that
a trust for charitable purposes of either real0 or personal7 property
for indefinite beneficiaries was held to be invalid. To take the
s'Thurston, Charitable Gifts and the Minnesota Statute of Uses
and Trusts, (1917) 1 MiNNESOTA LAW REv xv 201. This article also
includes a discussion of the similar history in New York, Michigan and
Wisconsin resulting in remedial legislation.
See also Fraser, The
Rules Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEw 314, 323 et seq.; Bogert, Trusts 196 et seq.; Zollman, American
Law of Charities 28 et seq.
A recent statement of the situation in New York is found in
Whiteside, Suspension of the Power of Alienation in New York, (1927)
13 Corn. L. Quart. 31, 37; see also Hinrichs, Charitable Trusts in
New York, (1929) 1 N. Y. Law School Rev. 95, 133.
Recent cases involving the statutory changes in Michigan are:
Scudder v. Security Trust Co., (1927) 238 Mich. 318, 213 N. \V. 131;
Greenman v. Phillips. (1928) 241 Mich. 464, 217 N. W. 1. Cf. Moore
v. O'Leary, (1914) 180 Mich. 261, 146 N. W. 661, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1203, Ann. Cas. 1916A 373, which was decided before the latest amendments to the statute.
The Wisconsin cases are discussed by Professor Zollman in (1921)
1 Wis. L. Rev. 129 and in (1924) 8 Marquette L. Rev. 168. The latest
cases since those articles appeared are: Estate of Briggs, (1926) 189
Wis. 524, 208 N. V. 247; In re Lott's Will, (1927) 193 Wis. 409,
214 N. W. 391; In re Monaghan's Will, (Wis. 1929) 226 N. W. 306;
Matson v. Town of Caledonia, (Wis. 1929) 227 N. W. 298.
4Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8081.
5
The purposes now authorized are to be found in Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat.. sec. 8090. It has been shown that our statutes on trusts.
which at one time narrowly restricted trusts, have been so broadened
by amendment that private trusts for every purpose possible at comnmon law are now possible under our statutes. Fraser, The Rules
Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1925) 9 MINNEso'rA LAw Riwl.w
314, 323-324. The statute now under discussion completes this departure from the original theory of the statutes by authorizing charitable trusts.
6
Little v. Willford, (1883) 31 Minn. 173, 17 N. W. 282: Beinis
v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1912) 117 Minn. 409, 135 N. W. 1124.
7Shanahan v. Kelly, (1903) 88 Minn. 202. 92 N. W. 948; Benis v.
Northwestern Trust Co., (1912) 117 Minn. 409, 135 N. W. 1124; Bogart
v. Taylor, (1920) 144 Minn. 454, 175 N. W. 913.
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most recent case so holding as an example, in Bogart v. Taylor s a
bequest to one Taylor of money "to be used by him for the extension
of the Kingdom of God" in a certain church was held to be invalid.
This does not mean that all gifts to charity were invalid in
Minnesota. 9 The trusts statutes, themselves, expressly authorize
gifts to municipal corporations on trust for certain specified charitable purposes."0 Furthermore, a gift could be made to a corporation organized for charitable purposes. This gift could be absolute
or on condition that it be used for one or more of the purposes for
which the corporation was organized. But, for the reasons given
above, if a gift were construed as a charitable gift in trust for
indefinite beneficiaries, the gift would be void. 1' But the Minnesota court by a process of strained construction in a number of
cases has upheld such a gift as an absolute gift or a gift on
condition rather than in trust.1 2 A gift to a charitable corporation
s(1920) 144 Minn. 454, 175 N. W. 913. Compare a recent New
York case which sustained, under the present New York statutes, a
trust for the "advancement of Christ's Kingdom on earth." Matter
of Durbrow, (1927) 245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747, discussed infra, p. 601.
9
A recent case indicates thaf authorization for what amounts to
a charitable trust may be found in the statutes on religious societies.
Mabel First Lutheran Church v. Cadwallader, (1927) 172 Minn. 471,
479-480, 215 N. W. 845. That case involved, among other things, the
effect of a deed of land to certain individuals as trustees for a certain

church. At the time of the conveyance, the church was not incorporated; it was a voluntary unincorporated association. The purpose of
the conveyance was to provide a church site. A statute provided:
"Lands . . . conveyed by devise, grant, purchase or otherwise, to

any persons as trustees in trust for the use of any religious society
heretofore or hereafter organized, for a meeting house, burial ground
or parsonage . . . shall descend in perpetual succession, and be held

by such trustees in trust for such society." Mason's 1927 Minn. Star..
sec. 7971. Under that statute, the court held that the trust was valid
and that the title to the land vested in the church on its incorporation
by the operation of another statute. Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec.
7986. Before the incorporation, the trust was in substance a charitable trust for religious purposes. It was not a private trust because
of the indefiniteness of the, beneficiaries. See Lane v. Eaton (1897)
69 Minn. 141, 143, 71 N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A. 669, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559.
lOThe existing statute is Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8090. subdiv. 7. This provision is amended in effect, although not expressly,
by Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 209.
This provision was the basis for upholding a bequest of money
to a city as an endowment in perpetuity for a kindergarten. City of
Owatonna v. Rosebrook, (1903) 88 Minn. 318, 92 N. W. 1122.
As to the duties of municipal corporations when acting as trustees
of charitable funds, see (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 478.
"See Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 221, 100 N. W. 1104.
12Atwater v. Russell, (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629; Lane v.
Eaton, (1897)69 Minn. 141, 71 N. AV. 1031,38 L.R.A.669,65Ani.St. Rep.
559; Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 100 N. W. 1104; Young
Men's Christian Association v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W.
805; Little v. Universalist Convention, (1919) 143 Minn. 298, 173
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could be of the legal and equitable interest in the property or in
trust for it.13 Also the gift could be to a corporation to be
formed within a "reasonable" time. 14 But it has been held that
such a gift was not valid when the time of formation of the
corporation was left to the unlimited discretion of the trustees.15
Likewise, such a gift of land has been held void when the corporation was given five years in which to accept the gift on the ground
that the absolute power of alienation might be suspended for
longer than the statutory period of two lives in being, since the
period was measured not by lives but by years.1"
These methods of making gifts to charity are still available
under the new statute. In fact, it expressly so provides. 7 The
N. W. 659; see also Henrikson v. Swedish Baptist Mission Society,
(1925) 163 Minn. 176, 184, 203 N. W. 778.
For a discussion of whether such so-called conditions ;ire properlv
conditions strbsequent, see Fraser, Future Interests in Property in
(1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 320, 331.
Minnesota,
' 3 Cases where the gift was on trust for the corporation include:
Atwater v. Russell, (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629; Lane v. Eaton,
(1897) 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031. 38 L. R. A. 669, 65 Am. St. Rep.
559; Kahle v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod, (1900) 81 Min. 7,
83 N. W. 460; Young Men's Christian Association v. Horn, (1913)
404, 139 N. W. 806.
120 Minn.
14 Lane v. Eaton, (1897) 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A.
669, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559; Kahle v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod,
(1900) 81 Minn. 7, 83 N. W. 460; Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn.
210, 100 N. W. 1104.
15Bemis v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1912) 117 Minn. 409. 135
N. W. 1124. The court distinguished Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93
Minn. 210, 100 N. V. 1104 on the ground that in the latter case the
will required the corporation to be formed during two specified lives
in being. Query whether the other two cases cited in note 14 also
can be distinguished. As to the statutory and common law rules
against perpetuities applicable to trusts in Minnesota, see Fraser, The
Rules Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation, (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW Ri'.viv.w 31'4.

' 6 Rong v. Haller, (1909) 109 Minn. 191, 123 N. W. 471, 123 N.
W. 806, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 825. The statutes are Mason's 1927 %film.
Stat., sec. 8044, 8045.
17Minn. Laws 1927, ch. 180, sec. 4; Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., see.
8090-4. "Nothing in this act contained shall in any manner impair,
limit, or abridge the operation and efficacy of the whole or any part
of any existing statute authorizing the creation of corporations for
charitable purposes or permitting municipal corporations to act as
Trustee for any public or charitable purpose under any existing statute.Y

No doubt a gift to a municipal corporation for one of the purposes
authorized could be sustained now under either statute. It recently
has been so held in Michigan under similar statutes. Greenmian v.
Phillips, (1928) 241 Mich. 464, 217 N. W. 1.

It is often a matter of some difficulty to determine which of
several possible legal devices is best adapted to carry out the intention of the donor of a gift to charity. One phase of this problem is
discussed ably in Simonton. Methods of Making Gifts of l.adl for

Charitable or Public Purposes, (1927) 33 W. Va. L. Quart. 317.
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new statute merely broadens the field for tle expression of charitable impulses. There is, however, the possibility that gifts to
corporations for charitable purposes which have been construed
as absolute gifts or gifts upon condition now will be given the
more natural construction of gifts on trust for charitable purposes,18 and therefore will be subject to the remedial devices provided for by the statute with all of their advantages.
ISThat seems to have been the experience in Wisconsin. See Maxcv
v. City of Oshkosh, (1910) 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. NV. 890, 31 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 787, particularly the concurring opinion of Marshall. J.. 144
Wis. 238, 277. In fact, at common law, a trust often is found rather

than a condition subsequent even when the word "condition" is used.

if from the whole instrument that construction carries out the intention of the settlor. That is illustrated by a recent Vermont case involving a gift to a corporation for charitable purposes. Middlebury
College v. Central Power Corporation, (1928) 101 Vt. 325, 340. 143
At. 384, 390. Cf. City of Providence v. Payne, (1926) 47 R. I. 444.
134 Atl. 276, involving a testamentary gift to a municipal corporation
for charitable purposes.
But the New York cases seem still to treat a gift to a charitable
corporation for some, Matter of Arrowsmith. (1914) 162 App. Div.
623, 147 N. Y. S. 1016, aff'd (1915) 213 N. Y. 704, 108 N. E. 1089.
or all, Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., (1921) 230 N. Y. 462, 130
N. E. 613, of the purposes for which it was created, as a gift not on
trust. See Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 3d ed..
sec. 522. But even so, in the latter case the court held that such gifts
come under the operation of the New York charities statutes. The
court said, p. 472-473:
1 "These acts . . . did more than make applicable
to this state the

doctrine of charitable uses. They authorized the court itself to apply
the cy pres rule not only where a trust existed but where property
had been devised or bequeathed to a corporation authorized to take and
hold it for charitable purposes." Cf. Matter of Potts. (1923) 205
App. Div. 147, 199 N. Y. S. 880, aff'd (1923) 236 N. Y. 658. 142 N. E.
323; Matter of Juilliard, (1924) 238 N. Y. 499, 506, 114 N. E. 772, both
cited in another connection in note 101.
Of course the New York cases do not mean that a corporation. at
least one which is not a strictly charitable corporation, cannot be trustee of a charitable trust. A recent example of a charitable trust with
a corporate trustee is found in 'Matter of Frasch, (1927) 245 N. Y.
174, 156 N. E .656. If a trust is clearly intended, it could be administered as a trust even though the named trustee is a charitable corporation. If the corporation is incapable of acting as trustee, the court
could administer the trust. See the remarks of Gray, J., in Matter of

Griffin, (1901) 167 N. Y. 71, 81-82, 60 N. E. 284; see also Jones v.

Habersham, (1883) 107 U. S. 174, 189, 2 Sup. Ct. 336, 27 L. Ed. 401.
A recent case supporting the writer's contention that a gift to a
charitable corporation should be construed and administered as a
charitable trust if under ordinary rules of construction a trust is
intended is Estate of Pri'ckett, (1929) 128 Or. 591, 275 Pac. 60i (devise
and bequest of residue to Portland Community Chest, a charitable
corporation, to "be expended by said charitable corporation in such
manner as it may deem advisable for the relief of young people in
the city of Portland who are and who may become in need of charitable assistance," held valid as a charitable trust.)
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In discussing the Minnesota statute1" and comparing it with
the common law of charitable trusts, it will be convenient to
consider specific problems.
PURPOSES OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

The title of the Minnesota statute provides for the creation
and administration of "charitable trusts." The text, however,
19
For convenient reference, the entire text of the Minnesota statute
follows. Minn. Laws 1927, ch. 180; Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec.
8090-1 to 8090-4 inclusive.
An act providing for the creation and administration of charitable
trusts.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota:
Section 1. Trusts created.-Express trusts of real or personal
property, or both, may be created to receive by grant, devise, gift,
or bequest, and to take charge of, invest and administer in accordance
with the terms of the trust, upon and for any charitable, benevolent,
educational, religious or other public use or trust.
Section 2. Not to be invalid for uncertainty.-No such Trust
shall be invalid because of indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object
of such trust or of the beneficiaries thereof designated in the instrument creating the same nor by reason of the same contravening any
Statute or rule against perpetuities, but no such Trust shall be construed so as to prevent or limit the free alienation of the title to any
of the trust estate by the Trustee in the administration of said Trust,
except as may be permitted under existing or subsequent Statutes.
Section 3. Liberal construction.-Such Trust shall be liberally
construed by the Courts so that the intentions of the Donor thereof
shall be carried out whenever possible, and no such Trust shall fail
solely because the Donor has imperfectly outlined the purpose and
object of such charity or the method of administration. Whenever it
shall appear to the District Court of the proper county that the purpose and object of such charity is imperfectly expressed, or the method
of administration is incomplete or imperfect, or that the circumstances
have so changed since the execution of the instrument creating the
Trust as to render impracticable, inexpedient, or impossible a literal
compliance with the terms of such instrument, such Court may upon
the application and with the consent of the Trustee. and upon such
notice as said Court may direct, make an order directing that such
Trust shall be administered or expended in such manner as in tie
judgment of said Court will, as nearly as can be accomplished the
general purposes of the instrument and the object and intention of the
Donor without regard to, and free from any, specific restriction, limitation or direction contained therein, provided, however, that no such
order shall be made without the consent of the Donor of said Trust
if he is then living and mentally competent. The attorney general shall
represent the beneficiaries in all cases arising under this act, and it
shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the

courts.

Section 4. Application.-Nothing in this act contained shall in
any manner impair, limit, or abridge the operation and efficacy of
the whole or any part of any existing Statute authorizing the creation
of corporations for charitable purposes or permitting municipal corporations to act as Trustee for any public or charitable purpose under
any existing Statute. Nothing in this Act shall apply to any gift.
bequest, devise, or trust, made, created, or arising by or under the
provisions of the wll of any person whose decease occurred before this
Act takes effect.
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authorizes trusts "for any charitable, benevolent, educational, religious or other public use or trust." Meaning can be attached to
those words only by reference to the common law cases. The
New York cases construing the similar New York statute frequently resort to the common law cases in determining whether
a particular purpose is charitable. 21 Although often attempted,-"
an accurate and zll-embracing definition of charity in the legal
sense is difficult if not impossible. Probably the best known
American definition is that by Mr. justice Gray in a leading
Massachusetts case, Jackson v. Phillips:"
"A charity in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a
gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit
of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds
or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving
their bodies from disease, suffering or restraint, by assisting them
to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public
buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burden of government."
The enumeration of specific charitable objects in the preamble
of the statute of charitable uses of 43 Elizabetl 4 has had great
influence, but has not been regarded as exclusive." The New
York court of appeals recently has put it this way :2
"Noi every charitable, educational or benevolent use is enumerated in the statute 43 Elizabeth (c.4) commonly called the statute
of charitable uses .... Conceptions of public charity, benevolence
2
OThe words there used are "religious, educational, charitable or
benevolent uses." Real Property Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws of New
York, 1923, ch. 51) sec. 113; Personal Property Law (Cahill's Consol.
Laws21 of New York, 1923, ch. 42) sec. 12.
For example, see the latest case in the New York court of anpeals.
22 Matter of Durbrow, (1927) 245 N. Y. 469, 474. 157 N. E. 747.
Various famous definitions are given and commented upon in
Zollman, American Lax-, of Charities, ch. IV, at p. 124 et seq. Sec
also Bogert, Trusts 190 et seq.
23(1867) 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 556.
2443 Eliz. ch. 4. (1601).
The objects enumerated in the preamble
are: "some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of
learning, free schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of
bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways.
some for education and preferment of orphans, some for or towards
relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief
or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any
poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out soldiers
and 25
other taxes."
The University of London v. Yarrow. (1857) 1 De. G. & J.
72, 79.
26Matter of Frasch, (1927) 245 N. Y. 174, 181, 156 N. E. 650.
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and education change with the passing generations. When the
courts are called upon to give effect to a statute covering trusts
to 'religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses', they construe those words as including at least those uses which prevailing
conceptions bring within the spirit of the statute of Elizabeth."
A useful classification of charitable objects is made in an important English case often referred to:2"'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions:
trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of
education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for
other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any
of the preceding heads.. The trusts last referred to are not the
less charitable in the eye of the law, because incidentally they
benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that
deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly."
One typical example"' of each of these divisions will close
this part of the discussion. The first three examples are from the
New York cases. In Allen v.Stevens,2"° the first case after thie
Tilden Act of 1893, a trust for the maintenance of a home for
the aged poor was sustained under that statute. In Butterworlh
v. Keeler30 a trust for the establishment of a school for girls was
upheld as a charitable trust for the promotion of education, the
court construing the will to mean a school not operated for
private profit. The latest case3" in the New York court of appeals
aptly illustrates a religious trust of the broadest kind in sustaining
a trust for the "advancement of Christ's Kingdom on earth."
-oCommissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel,

[18911
A. C.531, 583.
2

-oMany examples of what are and what are not charitable purposes may be found in the standard textbooks. 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, 4th ed.. sec. 1021-1024; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees,
7th ed., sec. 698-706; Bogert, Trusts 204-225: Zollman. Charities,
ch. V-IX: Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., ch. VI-X; Tudor,
Charities, 5th ed., ch. I.
For a good discussion of a problem not touched in the text, viz.,
when the purpose is against public policy, see (1917) 31 Harv. L.
Rev. 289.

20(1899) 161 N. Y. 122. 55 N. E. 568.
30(1916) 219 N. Y. 446, 114 N. E. 803. As to whether an educational charitable trust must be for the benefit of the poor alone, see
a recent discussion by Professor Bogert in (1930) 24 II1. L. Rev. 687;
see also (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 437.
3

1Matter of Durbrow. (1927) 245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747. In

this connection, it may be noted that it has been held in New York
that a trust for the saying of masses isa valid charitable trust. Matter
of Morris, (1919) 227 N. Y. 141, 124 N. E.724. Trusts of this nature
have caused much difficulty in other jurisdictions. See Bogert, Trusts
208-211: Zollman, American Law of Charities 177-180.
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The fourth catch-all class is typified by a trust for promoting
the permanent preservation of lands of beauty or historic interest. 2
INDEFINITENESS OF BENEFICIARIES AND OBJECT

The Minnesota statute provides:
"No such trust shall be invalid because of indefiniteness or
uncertainty of the object of such trust or of the beneficiaries thereof designated in the instrument creating the same."
So far as the indefiniteness of beneficiaries is concerned, the
statute states the common law rule. One of the principal differences between a private trust

33

and a charitable trust is that the

latter may have indefinite beneficiaries. 3" The illustrations already
given of valid charitable trusts show that. In fact, it is said
usually that the beneficiaries must be indefinite for the charitable
trust to be valid.3 5 There is, however, much difficulty in determining how small the class to be benefited by the trust may be.30
Two Massachusetts cases will indicate the nature of the problem.
In Kent v. Dunham,3 7 a trust "for the aid and support of those of

my children and their descendants who may be destitute, and in
the opinion of . . . [the] trustees need such aid" was held not

to be supportable as a charitable trust. The court said that there
was no general public object sufficient to justify an accumulation
of funds until there should be a destitute descendant, the mere
possible advantage which the public might obtain by the protection
of descendants of the testator from beggary and thus becoming a
public charge not being enough. In a later case, 3s the court held to
be valid as charitable a trust "for the benefit of the widows and
orphan children that may be left by the future ministers" of a
32

1n re Aerrall, [1916] 1 Ch. 100, 114. For other cases of this type
see Scott, Cases on Trusts 316-317. n.
33With the exception of certain limited classes of cases which
Professor Bogert calls "honorary trusts," the cestuis que trust of a
private trust must be definite and certain. Bogert, Trusts 422-425. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the question of when
they are sufficiently certain. The problem is acute in the case of
an unincorporated association as cestui que trust. See (1929) 42
L. Rev. 813.
Harv.
34
Blogert, Trusts 192.
3
5See Russell v. Allen, (1882) 107 U. S. 163, 167, 2 Sup. Ct. 327.
27 L. Ed. 397; Bogert, Trusts 192: but see Gray, Rule Against Per3rd ed., Appendix A, p. 531 et seq.
petuities,
36
There is a collection of cases on this question in Scott. Cases
on Trusts 327-330, n.
37(1886) 142 Mass. 216, 7 N. E. 730, 56 Am. Rep. 667.
3SSears v. Attorney General, (1907) 193 Mass. 551, 79 N. E. 772.
9 Ann. Cas. 1200.
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certain church, even though admittedly the class to be benefited
was quite small. Referring to the previous case, the court said:
"We infer ...that one reason of the decision is that the class
was not sufficiently large and indefinite to make the gift of common
and public benefit."
No doubt some such limitation will be made in the construction
of the Minnesota statute. There is some indication of that in the
construction of the New York statutes by the New York court
of appeals. In Matter of MacDowell,39 a trust to maintain a home
for poor gentlewomen, preference to be given to certain relatives
and friends and their lineal descendants, was held to be a valid
charitable trust in spite of the preference clause. But the court
said40 that if the benefit had been only for those persons and their
lineal descendants, it would not be a charitable trust.
Now as to the matter of the indefiniteness of the object of the
4
trust, there is much conflict of opinion in the common law cases. 1
It sometimes is said that although the beneficiaries may be indefinite, the purpose or object must be definite.4 2 To this writer, that
statement means that the beneficiaries may be indefinite but not
too indefinite. The object or purpose of the trust refers to the
possible beneficiaries of the trust. In view, however, of this usage,
it is significant that the Minnesota statute mentions both the object
and the beneficiaries.
This problem has two aspects which often are confused. The
first is easy to state. The trust must be limited to charitable
purposes, i. e., the trust will not be sustainable as a charitable
trust if under a proper construction of the trust instrument the
property may be used for purposes not charitable in the legal
sense.43 The leading case is the famous case of Mfoice v. The
39(1916) 217 N. Y. 454, 112 N. E. 177, L. R. A. 1916E 1246, Ann.
Cas. 1917E 853.
40(1916) 217 N. Y. 454. 463, 112 N. E. 177, L. R. A. 1916E 1246,
Ann. Cas. 1917E 853.
4'Discussions and collections of cases on this matter are available
in the standard text books. 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed.,
sec. 1025; Bogert, Trusts 200-204; Zollman, American Law of Charities, ch. IX, particularly sec. 356-362; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees,
7th ed., sec. 713, 713a. 713b.

Valuable discussions in the legal periodicals include: (1924)

8

MINxEsoTA LAw R Eviw 353; (1923) 8 Corn. L. Quart. 179: (1913) 61
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 507; (1912) 12 Col. L. Rev. 356; (1926) 12 Iowa
L. Rev. 454; (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 387:
L. Rev. 66; (1927) 22 Ill.
(1925)
73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 322; (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 1144.
42
Bogert, Trusts 200.
3
4 A good statement of this rule is to be found in a recent case.
182, 187, 162 N. 1'.
Morgan v. National Trust Bank, (1928) 331 Ill.
8-b 890.
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4
There a bequest to the Bishop of Durham
Bishop of Durham."

on trust to dispose of the property "to such objects of benevolence
and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall
most approve of" was held by Lord Eldon not to be supportable
as a charitable trust because the trustee-was not confined to acts
of charity in the legal sense, and therefore the court could not
enforce the trust. The trust was held to fail and a resulting trust
to the next of kin was decreed. 45 This rule undoubtedly will be
followed in Minnesota. The statute makes valid charitable trusts,
not trusts for indefinite purposes not charitable. The New York
statutes have been so construed.4"

The application of this rule often leads to difficult problems
of construction on the question of whether or not the particular
words of a particular trust instrument limit the trust to strictly
charitable purposes. There has been much litigation on that
matter with conflict of judicial opinion on the meaning of certain
words 4 7 Two New York cases will serve as illustrations. In
Matter of Shattuck," a trust to pay the income "to religious,
educational or eleemosynary institutions as in his [the trustee's]
judgment shall seem advisable" was held not to be valid as a
charitable trust because of the possible devotion of the income
to a private use, the court emphasizing the fact that the trustee
was not limited expressly to educational institutions which are
public or charitable. A more reasonable construction was adopted
in Matter of Frasch,4" where the court limited the Shattuck Case
to its facts. The FraschCase involved a trust for the establishment
41(1805) 10 Ves. Jr. 521, affirming the decree of the Master of

the Rolls in (1804) 9 Ves. Jr. 399.
"Whether the trust could have been sustained on principles of
the law of private trusts and powers is a question not within the
scope of this paper. Dean Ames contended that it should have been
so sustained. (1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 389; Ames, Lectures on Legal
History 285. Professor Gray contended that it could not, (1902) 15
Harv. L. Rev. 509; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., Appendix
H. Those contentions are summarized and the state of the authorities
given in Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, (1917) 65 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 527, 538.
4Matter of Shattuck, (1908) 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455. This
case is discussed infra, p. 597.
47There is a lengthy collection of cases on that matter in Scott.
Cases on Trusts 275-277, n. See also Bogert, Trusts 216-218; Zollman,
American Law of Charities 264-274; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence.
4th ed., sec. 1025; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed., sec. 711-712.
As to the English cases, see Tyssen. Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., ch.
X; Tudor, Charities, 5th ed., p. 63-72.
48(1908) 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455.
49(1927) 245 N. Y. 174, 156 N. E. 656.
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of a fund for chemical research and for the payment of the
income, under the advice and supervision of the American Chemical
Society, to one or more incorporated institutions in the United
States upon their agreement to use the money in research in
the field of agricultural chemistry with the object of obtaining
results of practical benefit to the agricultural development of the
United States. The contention was made that the trustees might,
under the terms of the will, choose a business corporation which
might use the funds to advance its own business interests. The
court, however, construed the will as not authorizing any institution selected to use the money for any purpose not public.
In this connection, the wording of the Minnesota statute should
settle one question which has caused much difficulty in the common
law cases, viz., the construction of the word "benevolent." The
courts have reached different results in determining whether that
word, when used alone or with other words, extends the trust
object to include purposes not strictly charitable.50 The Minnesota
statute, however, seems to treat the words "charitable" and "benevolent" as synonymous ; ' for it authorizes trusts "for any charitable,
benevolent, educational, religious or other public use or trust."
Similarly, the New York statutes5 2 refer to "religious. educational,
-OIn addition to the citations in note 47, see (1928)

1 So. Calif.

L. Rev.
180; (1919) 29 Yale L. J. 242.
5
1Cf. Estate of Hinckley, (1881) 58 Calif. 457, 511. where. in sustaining- as a charitable trust a trust for "human beneficence and charity," the court was aided by the provisions of a section of the Civil
Code regulating bequests or devises to "any charitable or benevolent
society, or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust for charitable uses" (p. 484). The court said (p. 511). "By that section charitable and benevolent corporations are placed upon the same footing;
and it is to be supposed the 'trusts to charitable uses.' mentioned inliediately afterwards, include the same purposes as those for which the
corporations named may be organized."
But cf. Hays v. Harris, (1913) 73 NV. Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827. The
statute there involved (73 W.Va. 17, 21) made valid conveyances to
trustees for the use of certain educational institutions, or certain named
societies, or an orphan asylum, children's home. "or other benevolent
The court said (73 W.Va. 17, 22-23) that
association or purpose."
the word benevolent "is more comprehensive and wider in its scope
of meaning than the word charitable, and may include what are not
recognized as charities in the old English law." That statement is
quoted in a recent case, Gallaher v. Gallaher, (1929) 106 W. Va.
588, 591, 146 S. E. 623, 624. and is discussed in (1928) 34 W. Va. L.
Quart. 386. But it is to be noted that the statute involved (lid not
couple the word "benevolent" with the word "charitable" as the Millnesota statute does. Furthermore, the title of the Minnesota statute
uses only the word "charitable."
See also Smith v. Pond, (1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 211, 111 Atl. 154,
where a statute entitled an "Act concerning corporations . . . organized
for religious educational, charitable or benevolent purposes" empowered
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charitable or benevolent uses." Under those statutes, a trust for
the application of money "to such charitable and benevolent associations and institutions of learning for the general uses and purposes
of such associations and institutions as my said executors may
select" has been sustained as a charitable trust.5 3
In conclusion, as to the first aspect of the problem of indefiniteness of purpose, it may be added that expensive litigation on some
of these questions may be avoided by the elimination of words
having no technical legal significance in the drafting of wills or
other instruments designed to create charitable trusts.
The second aspect of this problem may be stated in this way.
Assuming that the trust is restricted to charitable purposes in
the legal sense, how broad may those purposes be? There is a
good deal of difference of opinion in the cases."' The most extreme
case, of course, is a trust for charity without the designation of
any particular charity. One view on a trust of that character is
represented by a Kentucky case. In Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School' 5 a devise and bequest to the Archbishop of
Baltimore "for charitable objects, to be expended for said objects
in this diocese of Louisville, according to his discretion" was held
to be invalid for uncertainty. The court said that since the
will selected no class out of the wide range of charitable objects,
the court could not tell whether the object selected by the archbishop
would be approved of by the testator. The other view that such
a trust is valid has been taken in a long line of Massachusetts
cases.56 That view is supported ably by the court in a recent
Washington case:'such corporations to take property and hold it in trust for those
purposes. In sustaining a bequest to such a corporation for "such
benevolent purposes" as the trustees of the corporation should direct.
the court said, "The use of the words 'charitable or benevolent' in the
statute shows that the purpose of the legislature was to validate trusts
which were benevolent, although not charitable, in their nature." The
trust could have been sustained on the ground that the statute made the
words "charitable and benevolent" synonymous, and comnon law precedents
52 as to the meaning of charity thus would be available in all cases.
Real Property Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws of New York, 1923.
ch. 51) sec. 113; Personal Property Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws of
New5 York,
1923, ch. 42) sec. 12.
33 Matter of Cunningham, (1912) 206 N. Y. 601. 100 N. E. 437.
54
See the citations in note 41, particularly (1923) 8 Corn. L
Quart. 179. See also Scott, Cases on Trusts. 339-341. n.; notes in 14
L. R. A. (N.S.) 49 and 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 993. In England. indefiniteness of object seems to have no effect on the validity of a charitable
trust Tudor, Charities. 5th ed., p. 129.
- (1899) 107 Ky. 382, 410, 54 S.XV. 200, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1107.
5
GGill v. Attorney General. (1908)
197 'Mass. 232. 236, 83 N. E.
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"We are unable to see why a bequest to charity generally may
not be in law rendered certain and legally effectual by the exercise
of an appointing power vested in some one by the testator, as well
as a bequest to charity, in terms limited to some named class of
persons or objects, may be rendered certain and legally effectual
by the exercise of an appointing power vested in some one appointed
by the testator."
There should be no doubt that this view is embodied in the
Minnesota statute by reason of the broad language above quoted
concerning indefiniteness of the object or beneficiaries.5 8 'The
New York statute is not so broad as the Minnesota statute, since it
mentions only indefiniteness of beneficiaries.59 Yet a remarkable
development* has taken place toward what may be called the liberal
view of sustaining trusts for little defined charitable purposes.
It is a far cry from Matter of Shattuck 0 to Matter of Durbrow.0t
The Shattuck Case, as shown above, 2 held the indefinite trust
there involved invalid on the theory that the trust was not limited
to strictly charitable purposes. However, the court made this
statement:
"The act of 1893 doubtless saves a trust from being invalid
because the beneficiaries are indefinite and uncertain, but a trust
may be so indefinite and uncertain in its purposes as distinguished
676. A recent case shows that the person having the power of appointment to charity need not be the trustee. Reilly v. McGowan, (Mass.
1929)5 7 166 N. E. 766.
1n re Planck's Estate, (1928) 150 Wash. 301, 308, 272 Pac. 972.
974. In that case the will provided as to the residue that it was to go
"to charity and to charitable purposes" and authorized the executrix
to dispose of it "to worthy charities and to such charitable purposes
as she may believe to be fit and proper recipients thereof." That part of
the will was held to be valid.
Likewise, in a recent Ohio case involving a so-called community
trust giving a commitee wide discretion in the selection of charitable
objects in the city of Cleveland, the court sustained the trust on' the
ground that the trustee could select the charitable objects under the
supervision of the court. Linney v. Cleveland Trust Co., (1928) 30
Ohio App. 345, 165 N. E. 101.
The same view has been adopted in Wisconsin by statute. See
In re Monaghan's Will, (Wis. 1929) 226 N. W. 306.
5sThis is strengthened by the provision in section 3 of the Minnesota statute that "no such trust shall fail solely because the Donor has
imperfectly outlined the purpose and object of such charity or the
method
of administration."
5
1"No gift .. .to . . . charitable ...
uses . ..shall be deemed
invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons
designated as the beneficiaries. ... ." Real Property Law (Cahill's
Consol. Laws of New York, 1923, ch. 51) sec. 113; Personal Property
Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws of New York. 1923, ch. 42) sec. 12.
6o(1908) 193 N. Y. 446. 451, 86 N. E. 455.
61(1927) 245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747.
62p. 597.
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from its beneficiaries as to be impracticable, if not impossible for
the courts to administer."
In the Durbrow Case, the will directed that the residuary
estate be distributed by the executor where he "in fiis . . . judgment shall consider it will be most effective in the advancement
of Christ's Kingdom on earth." The court construed this to
include not only doctrinal propagation but also education of the
young and care of the sick under church auspices. Thus broadly
construed, the trust6 3 was sustained. After pointing out that the
Shattuck Case had been confined strictly to its facts by later and
"better considered" cases, 64 the court said: "Broadness of scope
and generality of purpose do not in themselves breed impossibility
of execution."
Suppose that in a charitable gift of the general character just
considered no trustee or other person to designate the particular
purposes to be carried out is named or if named never exercises
the power. What is to be done? That presents one of the questions connected with our next problem.
THE CY PRES POWER

The Minnesota statute provides:
"Whenever it shall appear to the district court of the proper
county that the purpose and object: of such charity is imperfectly
expressed, or the method of administration is incomplete or imperfect, or that the circumstances have so changed since the execution of the instrument creating the trust as to render impracticable.
inexpedient, or impossible a literal compliance with the terms of
such instrument, such court may upon the application and with the
GsAlthough there was no formal gift in trust, the court implied
(1927) 245 N. Y. 469, 477, 157 N. E. 747.
But the same court has refused to spell out a trust when the gift
is to an unincorporated charitable association. Ely v. Megie, (1916)
219 N. Y. 112, 143, 113 N. E. 800; cf. Fralick v. Lyford. (1905) 107
App. Div. 543, 95 N. Y. S. 433, aff'd (1907) 187 N. Y. 524, 79 N. E.
1105; see the criticism -by Professor Scott in (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev.
688, 695. There is authority contra. American Bible Society v. Americant Tract Society, (1901) 62 N. J. Eq. 219, 50 Atl. 67; see (1927)
37 Yale L. J. 258-259. Cf. Bates v. Schillinger, (Me. 1929) 145 Atd. 395.
vhere a bequest to an unincorporated church society to be used for the
society was sustained as a charitable trust. The court said that failure
to name a trustee would not cause the gift to fail; the court would
administer the trust or appoint a trustee to do so.
G4Citing Butterworth v. Keeler, (1916) 219 N. Y. 446, 114 N. E.
803; Matter of Frasch, (1927) 245 N. Y. 174, 156 N. E. 656. In the
former case, the court said (219 N.Y. 446, 450) that the Shattuck Case
"lays down no principle of large and general application. It defines
the meaning of a particular will, and later cases have held that it must
be limited to its special facts."
one.

MINNESO7A LAW REVIEW

consent of the trustee, and upon such notice as said court may
direct, make an order directing that such trust shall be administered
or expended in such manner as in the judgment of said court
will [carry out],'3 as nearly as can be accomplished the general
purposes of the instrument and the object and intention of the
donor without regard to, and free from any, specific restriction,
limitation or direction contained therein, provided, however, that
no such order shall be made without the consent of the donor
of said trust if he is then living and mentally competent. The
attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries in all cases arising
under this act, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by
proper proceedings in the courts."
This provision states, with some modifications, presently to be
noticed, the judicial cy pres power which has been exercised by
courts of equity for centuries. A similar provision in the New
York statutes has been referred to as establishing the cy pres
doctrine. 6
Cy pres is a law French expression meaning as near as.-'
The doctrine of cy pres involves the notion of approximating the
intention of the donor when his exact intention is not to be
carried out for some reason."
In England there are two kinds of cy pres: the prerogative
cy pres exercised by the Crown as parens patriae under the sign
manual, and the judicial cy pres. The prerogative power has been
exercised at times in an arbitrary manner. The example usually
given is the notorious case of Da Costa v. Do Pas." In that case
a testamentary gift for the advancement of the Jewish faith was
held to be incapable of taking effect as directed because contrary
to the established religion and to be at the disposal of the Crown.
65
Some such expression must be read into the statute to fill out
verb form beginning with the word "will."
the incomplete
6
eAatter of MacDowell, (1916) 217 N. Y. 454, 466, 112 N. E. 177,
L.R.A. 1916E 1246, Ann. Cas. 1917E 853; Sherman v. Richmond Hose
Co., (1921) 230 N. Y. 462, 472, 130 N. E. 613.
Other cases in the New York court of appeals involving the cy pres
doctrine include: Bowman v. Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society, (1905) 182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535; Trustees of Sailors' Snug
Harbor v. Carmody, (1914) 211 N. Y. 286, 105 N. E. 543.
671 Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd revision, p. 745.
6
SFor general treatments of the doctrine and its use in this country
see Zollman. American Law of Charities, ch. 3; 2 Perry, Trusts and
Trustees, 7th ed., sec. 717-730; Bogert, Trusts, 225-231; 3 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 1027, 1029; (1923) 7 MIN,,ss'rA
LAw REviEw 174; (1924) 8 MXNNEsOTA LAw REviEw 353; (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 598; (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 430. As to the English
cases, see Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., ch. XVII; Tudor,
Charities, 5th ed., ch. IV.
r9(1754) 1 Amb. 228.
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The king by his sign manual directed the money to be used toward
supporting a preacher to instruct children in a foundling hospital
in the Christian religion.
It is said that the American courts do not have the prerogative
cy pres power but that it is vested in the legislatures subject to
constitutional limitations30 It becomes, therefore, important at
times to determine where the judicial cy pres power leaves off and
the prerogative power begins. This is not always easy to do.'
The question has been raised in cases where the gift is to charity
generally without the designation of any particular charitable
purpose. The leading English case is Moggridge v. Thck-wll."
The bequest was to one Vaston "desiring him to dispose of the
same in such charities as he shall think fit," with certain recommendations by the testatrix. Vaston died before the testatrix.
Lord Eldon, after showing the confusion in the cases, held with
some hesitation that it was proper to dispose of the property
under a scheme approved by the master rather than by the king.
Lord Eldon said73 that,

"the general principle thought most reconcilable to the case
is, that, where there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing
itself upon any object, ... the disposition is in the King by Sign
Manual; but where the execution is to be by a trustee with general
or some objects pointed out, there the court will take the administration of the trust."
In a later case,74 in which a bequest in trust for charitable
purposes was held to be the subject of a scheme before the master,
Lord Eldon said:
"Where the bequest is to trustees for charitable purposes, the
disposition must be in that mode, but where the object is charity,
without a trust interposed, it must be by Sign Manual. That is the
distinction which I adopted in. the case of Moggridge Z,. Thackwell."
70
See Morman Church v. United States. (1890) 136 IT. S. 1. 56. 10
Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481; In re Lott's Will, (1927) 193 Wis. 409.
214 N. W. 391; ,but see Zollman, American Law of Charities 116-118.
71In addition to the citations in note 68 supra, see (1923) 8 Corn.
L. Quart. 179; (1928) 13 Corn. L. Quart. 310; (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 573. For discussions of the English cases, see Tyssen, Charitable
Bequests, 2d ed., ch. XVIII; Tudor, Charities, 5th ed., ch. V.
72(1803) 7 Ves. Jr. 36.
,3(1803) 7 Ves. Jr. 36. 86.
74 Paice v. The Archbishop of Canterbury, (1807) 14 Ves. Jr. 364.
372. Both cases were quoted from and followed in In re Pyne, [19031
1 Ch. 83, holding: that a scheme should be directed by the court where
the trust was "for such charitable purposes . . . as may be hereafter set
forth in any codicil ... to this my will." No codicil ever was executed.
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Both cases were cited and relied upon in a Massachusetts case,
Minot v. Baker. 75 The will gave the residue to Healy "to be
disposed of by him for such charitable purposes as he shall think
proper." Healy died without disposing of most of the residuary
estate for charitable purposes. In an able opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, the court found, as a matter of construction, that the
limitation to charity was not conditional upon the appointment
being made by HealyT0 and directed that the money be applied to
charitable purposes according to a scheme under the direction of
the court. The court regarded the adoption of Lord Eldon's
view in this country as necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
Some American courts, however, have not been willing to go
this far. 7 The Minnesota statute is broad enough to warrant tile
following of the Massachusetts doctrine. It specifically provides
for the situation when the "method of administration is incomplete
or imperfect." In passing, it may be said that there would seem
to be no need, in a case like those just discussed, for a cy pres
application when the trustee is alive and willing to exercise the
power given to him under the terms of the trust. It has been so
held in New York.""
Consideration of when and how the judicial cy pres should be
exercised may be prefaced by an example of tile operation of that
doctrine. Probably the leading American case is Jackson v.
Phillips.9 Testator by the fourth article of his will made a
bequest to trustees to be expended for propaganda that would
"create a public sentiment that will put an end to negro slavery
in this country;" by the fifth article he made another bequest to
the same trustees "for the benefit of fugitive slaves who may
escape from the slave holding states of this infamous Union from
time to time." The executor brought a bill in equity for instructions, making tile trustees and heirs at law of the testator
parties. WVhile the case was under advisement, the thirteentlh
amendment to the constitution of the United States was adopted
abolishing slavery. In an opinion of much learning by Mr.
7.(1888)

147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839. 9 Am. St. Rep. 713.

7Gf the contrary finding were made, the trust would fail. Rogers

v. Rea, (1918) 98 Ohio St. 315, 120 N. E. 828; see Gambell v. Trippe,
(1892) 75 Md. 252, 23 AtI. 461, 15 L. R. A. 235, 32 Am. St. Rep. 388.
77Hadley v. Forsee, (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59, 14 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 49; see Fontain v. Ravenel, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 369, 15 L.
Ed. 78
80.
Rothschild v. Schiff, (1907) 188 N. Y. 327, 80 N. E. 1030.
79(1867) 14 Allen (Mass.) 539.
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Justice Gray, the court held that the bequests created valid charitable trusts; that they were not so restricted in objects or time as
to be terminated by the abolition of slavery in the United States,
and there was hence no resulting trust; and that the funds should
be applied cy pres under a scheme to be framed by a master and
confirmed by the court, with liberty to the attorney general and the
trustees to submit schemes for his approval. The case then was
referred to a master in chancery. The report of the master, made
after notice to and hearing of the trustees and the attorney
general, was adopted by the court with some slight changes.
The trustees were directed to apply the unexpended balance of
the bequest in the fifth article to the "use of necessitous persons
of African descent in the city of Boston and its vicinity, preference
being given to such as have escaped from slavery" and to pay
what remained of the fund bequeathed by the fourth article to the
treasurer of the New England Branch of the Freedmen's Union
Commission, "to be employed and expended by them in promoting
the education, support and interests generally of the freedmen
(late slaves)" in the states in which slavery had been abolished.
Here we have the use of the doctrine of cy pres at its best.
At this 1loint, certain limitations upon the application of the
judicial cy pres doctrine will be discussed briefly. For one thing,
the power is exercised properly only when a general charitable
intention, not restricted to the particular purpose named, can be
found. 0 In the case just stated, such a general intention was
found in the will. Another Massachusetts case will illustrate the
converse situation. In Bowden v. Brown,s t a testamentary gift
of the residuary estate to the town of Marblehead "toward the
erection of a building that should be for the sick and poor, those
without homes" was not accepted by the town. Hence the charity
could not be administered in the way stated in the will. The
court found that there was no general charitable purpose and
held that the gift failed and could not be administered cy pres
but the residuary estate went to the next of kin.
The Minnesota statute does not expressly make a general
charitable intention a condition precedent to the exercise of the
80 In addition to the citations in note 68 supra. see (1922) 35 Harv.
L. Rev. 477; (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 263; (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 335:
(1922) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 109.
A recent English case stating the problem in terms of conditions
subsequent and precedent is In re Monk, [19271 2 Ch. 197, 205.
81(1908) 200 Mass. 269, 86 N. E. 351, 128 Am. St. Rep. 419. See
the note to that case in Scott, Cases on Trusts, p. 355.
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statutory cy pres power.

It does, however, say that the district

court "may" make an order of administration in such manner as

will carry out as nearly as possible the "general purposes" of the
trust instrument. This seems to assume that the trust instrument shows "general purposes." Also, the use of the word "may"
indicates some discretion in the court. In view of this language
and of the common law background, it is believed that the limitation of the cy pres power under discussion will be) enforced in
Minnesota. That that view is to be taken under the similar
New York statute is at least hinted in a case in the New York
82

court of appeals.
Another limitation not so readily disposed of has to do with
the question whether the judicial cy pres power may be exercised
when the carrying out of the directions of the donor is anything
short of impossible.8 " It is said that physical impossibility is not
necessary if there be an impracticability amounting to substantial
impossibility.84 But that mere expediency is a sufficient basis
8
A few cases,
for a cy pres application generally has been denied.

7
however, by the language used8" or by the results reached" indi-.
82

Matter of MacDowell, (1916) 217 N. Y. 454, 465, 112 N. E. 177,
L. R. A. 1916E 1246, Ann. Cas. 1917E 853. In that case, the court
speaks of the "general charitable design" of the testatrix and cites a
number of common law cases including Jackson v. Phillips, (1867) 14
Allen (Mass.) 539 just discussed.
83
The cases are collected and discussed in (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev.
598, 601: (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 643. See also Zollman, American Law
of Charities, sec. 156.
For an able discussion of the power of the legislature in this field.
see Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, (1920) 34 llarv. L. Rev.
1. As to the legislative power over a charitable corporation under
reserved power to amend the corporate charter, see (1927) 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 891; Matter of Mount Sinai Hospital, (1928) 250 N. Y. 103,
164 N. E. 871.
84
Lackland v. Walker, (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 266, 52 S. W. 414. ("The
impossibility

. . .

must be more than a mere nervous apprehension, and

should be based on or arise from reasons which will warrant a judicial
conclusion that the condition disclosed is permanent in its nature. On
the other hand, it would be impracticable to grant relief only where
there is a showing of an absolute or physical impossibility, in the literal
sense of the term. An impracticability which evidences a substantial
impossibility will suffice.") See also Norris v. Loomis, (1913) 215
Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419.
85
In re Weir Hospital, [19101 2 Ch. 125; Harvard College v. Attorney General, (1917) 228 Mass. 396, 117 N. E. 903; Hicks Memorial
Christian Ass'n v. Locke, (Ark. 1929) 12 S. V. (2d) 866: see Trustees
Andover Seminary v. Visitors. (1925) 253 Mass. 256, 286. 148 N. E. 900.
8°Christian v. Catholic Church, (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 374, 377, 110
Atl. 87579.
In re Queen's School, [19101 1 Ch. 796; cf. Bruce v. Maxwell,
(1924) 311 I1. 479, 143 N. E. 82.
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cate a somewhat broader view of the scope of the judicial power.
The Minnesota statute uses the expression "impracticable, inexpedient, or impossible." The word "inexpedient" may mean a
broader power in the court than generally is conceded in the common law cases. On the other hand, the position of the word
between the words "impracticable" and "impossible" may show
that it is to be regarded as practically synonymous with the other
two words. At any rate, the common law cases will be useful
in determining the scope of the cy pres power under the Minnesota statute. Here again the fact that the statute says the court
"may" order a change shows the delicacy required in reconciling
as far as possible the interest of the creator of a trust and the
public interest.
The procedure on a cy pres application remains to be considered. In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the
cy pres power is in the court, not in the trustee. At common law,
the trustee of a charitable trust may not make a cy pres application of his own motion.58 Likewise, the cy pres provisions of
the Minnesota statute refer to applications to the court. Of course
this does not mean that the trust instrument could not give expressly to the trustee power to depart from the directions of the
settlor. That is often a desirable method of giving flexibility to
the trust and of making less necessary applications to the court."
The Minnesota statute says that the court may "upon the
application and with the consent of the trustee" make the cy pres
order. Under the similar provision in the New York statute,
the New York court of appeals has said that this method of
invoking the power of the court is not exclusive but that the
court may act on information by the state or even on its own
motion when the proper parties are before it.'O However that
may be, it is clear that both at common law' and under the
Minnesota statute the attorney general may and should be made
SSLakatong Lodge v. Franklin Bd. of Education, (1915) 84 N. J.
Eq. 112, 116, 92 Atl. 870: see Trustees Andover Seminary v.Visitors.
(1925)9 253 Mass. 256. 297, 148 N. E. 900.
s See (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 514, 518, n. 31, discussing in particular the flexibility of the modern community trust. The operation of
the community trust in New York is discussed in Hinrichs. Charitable
Trusts in New York, (1929) 1 N. Y. Law School Rev. 133, 142.
90
Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., (1921) 230 N. Y. 462, 473, 130
N. E.
613.
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Lackland v. Walker, (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 243, 52 S. W. 414:
see Attorney General v. Jolly, (1843) 1 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 99, 108.
1 Rich. Law (S.C.) 176, n., 42 Am. Dec. 349.
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a party to the proceeding. The statute provides that "the attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries in all cases arising
under this act." Under the New York statute, it has been held
to be proper to make the attorney general a party defendant in
2
cy pres pr6ceedings.
In this connection, it may be said by way of a slight digression
that in suits to enforce the carrying out of a charitable trust
the attorney general is a proper party plaintiff and usually is the
only person who has sufficient interest to bring the suit since he
represents the public. 9 3 In the exceptional situations where other
parties may be able to maintain the suit, the attorney general
should be made a party defendantY4 These common law rules
are adopted by the Minnesota statute by this provision:
"The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries in all
cases arising under this act, and it shall be his duty to enforce such
trusts by proper proceedings in the courts."
The Minnesota statute requires the consent of the donor "if
he is then living and mentally competent" to a cy pres order.
Under this provision the donor should be made a party to cy pres
proceedings. At common lawv, neither the donor 9r nor, if he be
dead, his heirs96 are necessary parties. The statute does not extend this right of the donor to his heirs.
PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

The Minnesota statute provides:
"No such trust shall be invalid . . . by reason of the same

contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities, but no such
trust shall be construed so as to prevent or limit the free alienation
92

Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Carmody, (1914) 211 N. Y.
286, 300, 105 N. E. 543.
03Dickey v. Volker, (Mo. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 278. This case
contains an able and exhaustive consideration of the English and American authorities.

See also (1928)

12
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LAw RlivImw 653.

04 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., p. 533, n. 6; but see
Zollman, American Law of Charities, sec. 615. An example of a
situation where others than the attorney general may sue as plaintiffs
to enforce the charitable trust is found in Trustees Andover Seminary
v. Visitors, (1925) 253 Mass. 256, 301-302, 148 N. E. 900. There the
visitors of the corporate trustee brought the suit making the attorney
general
a party.
9
5See Women's Christian Association v. Kansas City, (1898)
147 Mo. 103, 126-127, 48 S. V. 960. This case holds that'the donor's
heirs are not necessary parties but also puts the donor in the same
category.
As to the rights and powers of the donor and his heirs, see Bogert,
Trusts 247 and 449; Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, (1920)
34 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11-12; (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 533.
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of the title to any of the trust estate by the trustee in the administration of said trust, except as may be permitted under existing
or subsequent statutes."
Frequently it is said that at common law the rule against perpetuities does not apply to charitable trusts. This is true in the
sense that there is no time limit upon the duration of charitable
trusts, i.e., a charitable trust may last forever."
Because of
indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, there may be no one to alien
the beneficial interest because no one has such an interest0 8 But
the rule does apply to the extent that the gift in trust for charity
is void if it may not vest within the period of the rule." This
is subject to a rather anomalous exception where the gift follows
a previous gift in trust for charity. 1° b
The extent to which the Minnesota statute follows or departs
from these common law rules is open to some doubt. In New
York, without any provision in the charitable trusts statutes dealing with this matter, the courts appear to have adapted the comOGLackland v. Walker, (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 242, 52 S. W. 414.
'17 Bogert, Trusts 231-232; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed..
sec. 737; Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., 153; Tudor, Charities.
5th ed., 76. For a discussion of the social desirability of this rule.
see Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
For an interesting recent discussion in popular form of the social
aspects of perpetual charities, see Rosenwald. Principles of Public
Giving, (May 1929) 143 Atlantic Monthly 599; Pritchett, The Use and
Abuse of Endowments, (Oct. 1929) 144 Atlantic ,Monthly 517.
Contrast the rules applicable to non-charitable trusts with no
designated beneficiaries. See Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 60.
As to the related question of accumulations in charitable trusts,
see (1928) 41 Harv. L Rev. 514; (1924) 9 Corn. L. Quart. 496; (1930)
16 Va. L. Rev. 370; Bogert, Trusts, sec. 66; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed., sec. 738; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed.. see.
679; Tudor, Charities, 5th ed. 78; in New York, see Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 3rd ed., sec. 521.
9
SGray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed.. sec. 589, 590.
99
Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 594, 605, 606;
Bogert, Trusts, sec. 64; Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., 153;
Tudor, Charities, 5th ed., 75.
It is said, however, that if an intention can be found to make an
immediate gift to charity it will be sustained although its application
may be postponed indefinitely. Tudor, Charities, 5th ed.. 76; see
(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 986-987; but see Bogert, Trusts 234. This
rule is said to depend upon the doctrine of cy pres. Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 607-608. That the English cases rest on that
doctrine and that the rule itself is clear has been questioned. Tyssen.
Charitable Bequests,' 2d ed., 154-161, restating the position taken by
one of the editors in Sanger, Remoteness and Charitable Gifts, (1919)
29 Yale L. J. 46.
l0OBogert, Trusts 234; Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, 2d ed., 163:
Tudor, Charities, 5th ed., 81.
This exception is stated and criticized in Gray. Rule Against
Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 597-603g inc.
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mon law rules above stated to the statutes against perpetuities. 10
A similar adaptation to the Minnesota rules as to perpettitieso2

would be desirable. Clearly under the statute there is no time
limit upon the duration of charitable trusts. Not so clear is the
question of whether or not there is any limit upon the time in
which the gift in trust for charity must take effect. If the provision that no such trust shall be invalid "by reason of the same
contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities" be read
literally, there would seem to be no such limit. But it is possible
to interpret the statute as being merely declaratory of the rule so
often stated in the common law cases and therefore subject to
the limitations of that rule as indicated above. Furthermore, some
light may be shed by the following proviso of the statute that no
such trust "shall be construed so as to prevent or limit the free
.alienation of the title to any of the trust estate by the trustee
in the administration of said trust, except as may be permitted
under existing or subsequent statutes." This may mean only
that the trustee must have that power once the dministration
of the trust has commenced, but it could be construed to refer
to the time of the creation of the trust and to require that the
trustee acquire that power within the statutory period from that
time.
This proviso warrants some further comment. Does it apply
to personal property as well as real property? The Minnesota
statutes against suspension of the absolute power of alienation
for more than two lives in being are in the chapter on estates in
real property."°3 It might be assumed, then, that this proviso
'O'Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 3rd cd.. sec.
515-521 inc.; see Matter of Potts, (1923) 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N.
Y. S.880, aff'd (1923) 236 N. Y. 658, 142 N. E. 323; Matter of Juilliard,
(!924) 238 N. Y. 499, 506, 114 N. E. 772. Both cases recognize the
."theory of immediateness" where there is no precedent gift to private
persons. The former case has an exhaustive opinion. The court
quotes with approval from Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed.,
sec. 607. See note 99, supra.
It was settled soon after the enactment of the Tilden Act that
there is no limit on the duration of charitable trusts. Allen v. Stevens,
(1899) 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568. For a discussion of that case,
see Thurston, Charitable Gifts and the Minnesota Statute of Uses
and Trusts, (1917) 1 MINNESOrrA LAw REVIE:W 201, 209. See also Bogert,
Trusts,2 sec. 65.
1 As to the rules applicable to private trusts in Minnesota, see
Fraser, The Rules Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension' of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1925) 9
MiNNzEsoTA LAw REvIEw 314.
' 0 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8044, 8045.
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refers only to land. On the other hand, it could be argued that
the same period has been adopted for personal property.104 The
proviso is framed in terms of construction. If there is nothing
in the trust instrument about alienation or what there is is ambiguous, then this proviso should apply. But suppose that the
settlor expressly directed the trustee never to alien the trust
property. Then there hardly would be any question of construction. What effect would this proviso have upon such a direction?
Conceivably the trust might be held to fail. It could be contended, however, that the purpose of this proviso is to make such
a direction void and to free the trustee from any" such restriction. Even a valid restraint might be removed by the court under
the cy pres power under conditions before discussed warranting
the exercise of that power."" In the common law cases, a court
of equity sometimes has authorized an alienation""0 even in the
face of express directions of the settlor to the contrary."- That
a similar power in the courts exists in New York under the cy
pres provisions of the New York charities statute has been indi08
cated.1
STATUTE NOT RETROACTIVE

The Minnesota statute ends with this statement:
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to any gift, bequest, devise, or
trust, made, created, or arising by or under the provisions of the
1
willoD
of any person whose decease occurred before this Act takes
effect."
This provision, curiously enough, seems to restrict itself to gifts
1°4 perhaps the question is not of great practical importance as to
personal property because a settlor is not likely to restrict the alienation of personal property which usually is in the form of investments.
Compare the remarks of the court in Young Men's Christian Association v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 415, 139 N. NV. 805. It is conceivable,
however, that a settlor might direct that certain personal property
such as valuable pictures should not be sold.
A similar question exists as to the proviso of Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat., sec. 8090, subdivision 6. Compare the treatment of accumulations of income from personal property, a matter not expressly cov,ered by subdivision 6, in Congdon v. Congdon, (1924) 160 Minn.
343, 370,
200 N. W. 76.
' 05 See Lackland v. Walker, (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 248, 52 S. W. 414.
0
' °Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 590, n. 3: as to
the situation
in England, see Tudor, Charities, 5th ed.. p. 261-267.
07
Lackland v. Walker, (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. \V. 414: Scott.
Cases on Trusts 355, n.
lOsSee Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Carmody, (1914) 211
N. Y. 286, 105 N. E. 543.
' 0 9Italics ours.
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by will. That the rest of the statute is not restricted to testainentary dispositions is shown by the provision requiring consent
by the donor to a cy pres application if he is then living and
mentally competent. However, any attempt to apply the statute
retroactively to inter vivos, transactions would meet with constitutional objections. In a New York case,110 it was said that
the Tilden Act could not affect the property rights of the heirs
at law which vested previously by the failure of the trust.
CONCLUSION

The statute under discussion has restored to the law of Minnesota one of the legal devices for making gifts to charity. The
other devices previously used are still available, but the advantages
of the trust in.ease of creation and flexibility of admlinistration
may cause the older forms largely to be displaced. Charitable
trusts under the statute are in most respects as they were at common law and common law precedents will be useful in working
out the law in Minnesota. Even more valuable, perhaps, are
precedents from states which have had a similar legislative history
such as New York, Michigan and Wisconsin. Of those points
where the Minnesota statute departs from the common law, the
various questions discussed as to the matter of perpetuities and
suspension of the power of alienation are the most troublesome.
Prudence would suggest the avoidance of those questions by
express provisions in trust instruments at least until things are
clarified by judicial construction or amendment of the statute.
Time may show the desirability of more provision for administrative supervision over the administration of charities similar
to that made in England. 1 In the meantime, the statute is a
distinct advance in the Minnesota law of trusts.
"1OMurray v. Miller, (1904) 178 N. Y. 316, 324, 70 N. E. 870. See
also Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, (1910) 162 Mich. 457, 127 N. W. 673.
"'See Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, (1920) 34 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 3-5; Tudor, Charities, 5th ed., ch. VII on The Charity Commission and Board of Education. Compare an early criticism of the
New York statutes on charitable trusts for their lack of administrative
provisions in Fowler. Charitable Uses in New York, (1902) 2 Col.
L. Rev. 1, 22-23.

